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“TO BE OR NOT TO BE”: IMPAIRMENT PRACTICES
AMONG INDIAN LISTED COMPANIES
Jenny Wang*, Keith Hooper**
Abstract
India is converging its practices to be consistent with IFRS, but in the case of goodwill impairment
how much consistency is there among Indian companies and auditors, and how much impairment has
been disclosed. The paper investigates these questions. Arguably, the issue of how India writes-down
goodwill is important as Indian companies and the Indian share market are influential throughout the
world. It is a question of recognition, measurement and disclosure.
The findings are that different methods of writing down goodwill are recognised implying different
methods of measurement. There is even more inconsistency around disclosure as nearly half of the top
50 companies analysed on the Bombay exchange failed to mention any write down of goodwill. Some
companies claimed that they were testing for impairment but no case of actual impairment was
reported. This, in spite of some compaines reporting declining earnings and share price.
Keywords: India, Bombay, Goodwill, Impairment, Write-downs
* Department of Accounting & Finance, Unitec, Auckland, New Zealand
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1. Introduction

In late 2013, The Economist journal published an
article entitled “Goodwill Hunting” which reported a
conspicuous lack of impairment among public Indian
companies and identified as a possible explanation
“arm twisting” of auditors by powerful company
executives. To find out what is the case, this paper
sets out to examine the write-down practices of the
top 50 public companies listed on the Bombay
exchange.
International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) is fast becoming the global accounting
language. Over 100 countries have now adopted IFRS
and many more have committed to make the
transition in the next few years. The benefits of global
standards are widely acknowledged. For companies,
however, the conversion to IFRS is a major change
both for the finance function and for the wider
business. India is one of the largest jurisdictions that
are currently going through the process of
convergence with IFRS. Considering the diversity and
complexity amongst Indian Companies that will
undertake IFRS reporting, the Ministry of Corporate
Affairs (MCA) has announced a roadmap which
requires Indian Companies to adopt the converged
standards in a phased manner from 1 April, 2011
onwards.
The purpose of this study is to investigate
goodwill treatment among the 50 top listed Indian
Companies, on the Bombay exchange during the three
year period 2010-12, with regard to either
impairment, amortization or if there is a total

disregard for providing information about goodwill.
Also, the study considers the role of auditors and their
treatment or not of impairment in the accounts
especially in the light of declining share values and
price-earnings ratio.
In terms of the International Financial Reporting
Standards, goodwill acquired in a business
combination is an asset and must initially be
measured at cost (IFRS 3 par.51). After initial
recognition, the acquirer must
measure
this
goodwill at cost, less any accumulated impairment
losses (IFRS 3 par.54). The acquirer must test
goodwill for impairment annually, or more frequently,
if events or changes in circumstances indicate that it
might be impaired, in accordance with IAS 36,
Impairment of Assets (IFRS 3 par. 55). Because The
Economist in 2013 reports, in respect of Tata Steel, on
how “executives twist the arms” of auditors
pressurising then to delay impairments. Thus, the aim
of this study is to review and analysis the accounting
treatment of goodwill in Indian companies.
It may be argued that the new treatment of
goodwill has created potential auditing challenges for
auditors. Auditors will not only have to deal with
the unexpected complexities and ambiguities but
also regarding the assignment of fair value. To
examine causes and consequences, and in the case
typical case of Tata Steel, the Economist finds that
excess payment in acquisition should be related to
higher subsequent impairment loss. But testing for
impairment by auditors is one thing and actual
impairment is another.
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The literature (Bloom, 2009; Brunovs & Kirsch,
1991; Boyle & Carpenter, 2011; Ding et al., 2008;
Jennings, LeClere & Thompson, 2001; Moehrle,
Reynolds & Wallace, 2001) on goodwill behaviour
claims that the managerial acquiescence is the most
important determinant of write-down decisions. The
calculation of impairment is therefore subject to
manipulation and may be unreliable due to
management’s estimation. This study conducted on
the top 50 listed companies in India may provide
evidence of the extent of convergence with IFRS
practice. Another question to investigate is how the
Big 4, Second tier and Indian auditors are treating
goodwill in terms of reporting and how much they
have moved to IFRS impairment testing.
The study covers the top 50 companies only
listed in Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). The
enterprises are chosen on the basis of market
capitalization. We have collected data from the annual
reports of the companies, available on their websites.
The aim is to investigate if there is a consensus on the
method treatment of goodwill among Indian auditors.
The paper is organized as follows. The next
section discusses goodwill, the standards requiring
impairment and the problems associated with
impairment.
Further discussion considers the
arguments for and against amortization, the
advantages and disadvantages of impairment,
implications of impairment and the problems that
arise for auditors. With regard to the empirical
section, the method employed is explained followed
by the presentation of the findings from the analysis.
A final discussion concludes the paper.
2. Discussion and Review

Goodwill
In 2001, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(“FASB”) expressed its opinion that it is virtually
impossible to predict accurately the useful life of
goodwill and amortisation of goodwill is not a faithful
representation of the true pattern of declining
goodwill (FASB 2001b).
Subsequently, FASB
published the Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards (“SFAS”) 142, “Goodwill and other
intangible assets”, which prohibits amortisation of
goodwill.
SFAS 42 requires instead annual impairment
tests to reflect the true and fair view of the assets
values.The purpose of this accounting rule is to
encourage management to communicate privately
held information about goodwill and provide
stakeholders with better quality information to assess
the performance and future cash flows of the company
(Li et al., 2011; Ding et al, 2008; AbuGhazalehet al.,
2012). In order to seek international convergence and
global harmonisation, the International Accounting
Standards Board (“IASB”) followed the FASB’s
approach in 2004 by replacing IAS 22 with IFRS 3,

and converging with US GAAP. IFRS 3 declares that
from the beginning of the first annual period
beginning on or after 31 March 2004, all entities must
discontinue amortising goodwill and must test the
goodwill for impairment.
In the same year, IASB issued IAS 36
Impairment of Assets, which provided a two-step
approach for goodwill impairment testing as follows:
- Step 1: Compare the carrying amount of the
unit, including the goodwill, with its recoverable
amount. The recoverable amount of such a unit should
be measured, consistent with the requirements in IAS
36, as the higher of value in use and net selling price.
If the recoverable amount of the unit exceeds its
carrying amount, goodwill is not impaired. If not, then
follow Step 2.
- Step 2: Compare the implied value of goodwill
with its carrying amount. Implied goodwill
is the excess of the recoverable amount of the
unit to which the goodwill has been allocated over the
fair value of the net identifiable assets that the entity
would recognise if it acquired that unit in a business
combination on the date of the impairment test. Any
excess of the carrying amount of goodwill over its
implied value is recognised immediately, in profit or
loss, as an impairment loss. Any remaining excess of
the carrying amount of the unit over its recoverable
amount is recognised as an impairment loss and
allocated to the other assets of the unit on a pro rata
basis, based on the carrying amount of each asset in
the unit.
Prior theoretical and empirical research suggests
that acquirers often overpay for the target. These
studies argue that overpayment may result from
agency conflicts in mergers and tender offers (The
Economist, 2013). Managers may act in their own
self-interest at the expense of shareholders in order
to remain entrenched or to decrease the risk
associated with their managerial human capital. It has
found that higher payments of excess (acquisition
price as a percentage of target’s book value) and
premium (acquisition price as a percentage of target’s
price) are related to higher subsequent impairment
loss. Acquirers often overpay, when the purchase
consideration includes a high stock component, which
has a significant positive relation between the
interaction variable and impairment loss (Bloom,
2009; Brunovs & Kirsch, 1991).
Goodwill impairment loss is estimated in most
cases from management’s projections of future cash
flows. Thus, it is plausible that the impairment loss
conveys some private information of managers to
investors. Also, the subjectivity inherent in estimating
the impairment loss using unverifiable fair values
could reduce
the information content of the
impairment loss (Skinner, 2008). Thus, it may be
debatable whether the announcement of a goodwill
impairment loss reveals new information to market
participants.
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There are a number of questions that may be
raised around the concept of impairment. First,
whether the announcement of a goodwill impairment
loss provides new information to market participants.
Second, whether the impairment loss is related to
subsequent performance and thereby shed light on the
nature of the information conveyed by the
impairment. Third, whether the magnitude of
goodwill impairment can be predicted by proxies of
overpayment for the target at the time of the
acquisition (Boyle & Carpenter, 2011; Petersen &
Plenberg, 2010).
The difference in the measurement of goodwill
impairment and the timing of loss recognition under
SFAS 121 and SFAS 142 has implications for testing
impairment. The specific focus of SFAS 142 is on
goodwill as anasset, the guidelines for its fair value
measurement, and the periodic impairment testing
requirement suggest that recognition of goodwill
impairment under SFAS 142 may (arguably) be
more precise and timely relative to that under SFAS
121 and therefore may have a stronger market
reaction.
The literature shows that on average the market
revises its expectations downward on the
announcement of a goodwill impairment loss and the
downward revision is related to the magnitude of the
impairment loss.. Overall, the evidence suggests that
the announcement of goodwill impairment reveals
negative information about the firm to the market (Li
et al, 2011; Laghi et al, 2013; AbuGhazaleh et al,
2012).
There is discussion on the nature of the
information conveyed by the impairment loss. First, if
the impairment loss conveys managers’ private
information about the firm’s adverse future earnings
prospects, they expect financial analysts to revise
their earnings forecasts downward subsequent to the
loss announcement. The impairment loss thus appears
to be a leading indicator of a decline in future
profitability, likely because the company failed to
realize the expected benefits of prior acquisitions.
Further, they find that the announcement market
reaction can be largely attributed to investors revising
their expectations of future sales and operating profits
downward based on the information conveyed by the
impairment (Petersen & Plenberg, 2010).
Market participants respond to the unexpected
impairment loss negatively. Moreover, an expected
impairment of goodwill in fact significantly predicts a
decline in future performance. Taken together, these
results lead us to conjecture that the market perceives
that some firms with potentially impaired goodwill
have used their managerial discretion to avoid taking
the impairment loss in the post acquisition period.
This interpretation is consistent with the implications
of Ramanna and Watts (2010) that firms that avoided
taking an impairment loss may have acted
opportunistically.

The suggestion is that overpayment for acquired
targets could be a potential contributing factor to the
subsequent goodwill impairment. Thus, it appears that
the value of goodwill of these firms may have been
partly impaired at the outset due to overpayment for
targets and may have been further depleted by
subsequent negative events. Generally, investors and
financial analysts revise their expectations downward
on the announcement of an impairment loss. Further
analysis shows that the impairment loss is negatively
correlated with the average growth in sales and
operating profits of subsequent years. Moreover, the
market reaction can be attributed mainly to news
about the decline in subsequent sales and operating
profits that is conveyed by the impairment loss (Li et
al, 2011; Laghi et al, 2013; AbuGhazaleh et al, 2012).
Wang (2011) found that the change from
amortisation to impairment promotes and improves
the investors' understanding of the components of
companies’ earnings and also clears up their
confusions on goodwill amortisation information.
Subsequently, the accounting treatment on goodwill
in most listed companies in Anglo-Saxon countries
are no longer amortised, instead there is testing for
impairment annually or whenever there is an
indication that the goodwill may be impaired, in
accordance with IFRS 3. Public companies have to
recognise an impairment loss when the carrying
amount exceeds the recoverable amount. Goodwill
impairment loss may show some correlations with
operations, performance and investors’ confidence (Li
et al., 2011). First, goodwill impairment was found to
be a leading indicator of a decline in prospective sales
and operating profits, and of a failure to realise the
expected benefits from prior acquisitions. Second,
overpayment for the prior acquisition could be
another potential contributing factor as companies
recognise the overpayment in terms of goodwill
impairment by subsequent negative events. Third, the
announcement of a goodwill impairment loss would
influence investors’ confidence and cause financial
analysts to revise their expectations of prospective
cash flows downwards.
Although the impairment test is costly, time
consuming and susceptible to manipulation, it is
arguably a better approach for reflecting future
prospects of investments and gives a true and fair
view of the business. It is worth noting that the IASB
has recently decided to conduct a post implementation
review (the “PIR”) on IFRS 3 which introduces some
possible solutions to address the existing issues
encountered. This includes improving the existing
impairment test rules and disclosure requirements by
IAS 36 and reintroducing goodwill amortisation in
addition to the impairment test (Laghi et al., 2013).
Intangible assets are the most difficult to value in
acquisition accounting, and one of the most complex
and controversial of the intangible assets is goodwill.
At its most basic goodwill is an acquisition premium.
Goodwill is the cost above the fair value of a firm
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once all the assets of the firm have been stated at fair
value (Skinner, 2008).
Amortisation
The literature (Nobes & Parker, 2012) reveals the
goodwill reflects the ability of a company to earn an
excess return on investment. Systematic amortisation
with additional impairment testing assumes that the
factors that constitute acquired goodwill generally
diminish in value over time, and that the related costs
are systematically charged to income over the useful
life of the goodwill.
Some debate (Bloom, 2009; Brunovs & Kirsch,
1991; Boyle & Carpenter, 2011; Ding et al., 2008;
Jennings, LeClere & Thompson, 2001; Moehrle,
Reynolds & Wallace, 2001) regarding the most
appropriate method of accounting for goodwill that
arises from an acquisition raged during the early
1990s and again during the early 2000s. The debate in
the early 1990’s resulted in the general amortisation
of goodwill. Conceptually, amortisation is a method
to allocate the cost of goodwill over the period it is
consumed. This is consistent with the approach taken
with regard to other fixed assets that do not have
indefinite useful lives (IASB 2004d). Overpayment
for the assets of an acquired company generally
reflects an expectation of high future earnings.
Amortisation of this overpayment ensures that the
overpayment is matched with the expected future
earnings (Boyle & Carpenter 2011; Fontanot 2003).
Although the useful life of goodwill cannot be
predicted, an amortization period of between 20 to 40
years was often applied, with a satisfactory level of
reliability; systematic amortisation provides an
appropriate balance between conceptual soundness
and operationality at an acceptable cost.
Impairment
versus
amortisation:
advantages of impairment

Another argument against amortisation of
goodwill is based on the assumption that goodwill is a
wasting asset (that is, finite), and thus ignores the fact
that some kinds of goodwill can have an indefinite
useful life. The value of a business, and consequently
of its goodwill, does not necessarily wear out. It can
be maintained or even improved by careful
management and by cash expenditure charged against
the income stream.
The underlying logic for removing the
traditional amortisation method is that amortisation
on a straight-line basis over a set number of
years contains no information value for those using
financial reports (Ravlic, 2003). In a review of capital
markets research, Clinch (1995) concludes that there
is no clear evidence of any association between
goodwill amortisation and share values. That is, there
is little, if any, firm evidence that goodwill
amortisation expense included in the calculation of
periodic profit reflects information that is used by
investors in setting share prices and returns. A
problem of the amortisation method relates to time
period estimation. An estimate of the useful life of
goodwill becomes less reliable as the length of the
useful life increases (Waxman, 2001). By being based
on an actual valuation of goodwill, the IFRS-based
standard’s impairment testing policy moves away
from an arbitrary assessment of useful life. The
overall advantage, from a balance sheet perspective, is
that the valuation of goodwill will be more closely
aligned to a real assessment of asset value, rather than
reflecting an arbitrary “cost less accumulated
amortisation” calculation. Also, from an income
statement perspective, any recognition of a loss as a
result of a write-down in the valuation of goodwill
will be more closely aligned to a real economic
decline in value rather than an arbitrary amortisation
calculation. The new treatment should therefore be
more aligned with the decision- making needs of
financial report users (Ding et al, 2008).
Disadvantages of impairment

One of the main arguments of the FASB in proposing
the impairment approach was that it would lead to
improved financial reporting, because the financial
statements of entities that acquire goodwill would
reflect the underlying economics of those assets
better. As a result, financial statement users would be
better able to understand the investments made in
those assets and the subsequent performance of those
investments (FASB 2001b).
According to Moehrle (2001), a good
impairment test promotes transparency, because the
trigger is a change in underlying economic or
business conditions, not an arbitrary period. As a
result, reporting is based on current events that affect
the business. If it is properly managed, goodwill is an
appreciating asset, and if it is not properly managed,
the impairment test will recognise any reduction in
value (Petersen & Plenberg, 2010).

With regard to the capitalisation of internally
generated goodwill, one of the main arguments of the
respondents to ED 3 in support of amortisation was
that it prohibits the recognition of internally
generated goodwill, which is consistent with the
general prohibition in IAS 38 on the recognition of
internally generated goodwill (IASB 2004d).
The
impairment test does not distinguish between acquired
goodwill and this pre-existing goodwill of the
company that is being acquired, nor between acquired
goodwill and the goodwill internally generated after
the combination
Goodwill impairment is not without its
problems. First, the impairment test may impose
significant cost on companies (Wiese, 2005). The
valuation of goodwill is complex and unlikely to be
verifiable, thus specialised experts and specific
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valuation techniques are often required for
impairment test. According to a survey conducted by
the American Business Conference, Grant Thornton,
LLP, and the NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc. (Lewis et
al., 2001), 71% of selected CFOs in the survey would
use “outside assistance” to perform the impairment
test. Second, the impairment test may be liable to
manipulation. The impairment criteria provided by the
standard are drafted in such a way as to leave
significant room for managerial discretion,
interpretation, judgement and bias (Massoud &
Raiborn, 2003). Companies may act opportunistically
by using their greater managerial reporting discretion
to avoid reporting an impairment loss (Li et al., 2011).
Management may act for their self-interest at the
expense of shareholders as considerations of vanity
arise after an overpayment for an acquisition becomes
apparent. Third, the uncertainty and subjective
judgements involved in impairment tests may affect
the reliability of the information provided by the
disclosures demanded by users of financial statements
to assess future cash flow generated from goodwill
(Wang, 2011). Such subjectivity may make it no less
arbitrary than amortisation (Wiese, 2005).
There are possibilities for companies to enhance
their earnings per share at a satisfactory level without
taking any impairment on goodwill. This could
deceive investors into considering that such
companies are doing better than anticipated, thus
increasing and overvaluing their stock prices (Basi &
Penning, 2002). The accounting treatment of goodwill
has been a long standing issue of concern to
accountants and accounting standards committees for
more than a decade. Both amortisation and
impairment tests involve a certain degree of
subjectivity, and have different drawbacks either in
implementation difficulties or theoretical support
(Boyle & Carpenter, 2011; Petersen & Plenberg,
2010). There is no perfect solution to satisfy everyone
on the options of how to recognise the decline in the
value of goodwill.
Impairment can have an arbitrary effect on
earnings as annual systematic charges to goodwill
are more objective than periodic reviews for
impairment. The latter would allow firms greater
opportunities to manage their earnings (Schoderbek &
Slaubaugh 2001). There is also the issue of
complexity: IFRS 3 puts its faith in a potentially
unreliable and very complex impairment test. The
projection of future cash flows is difficult,
especially in developing and volatile industries
(such as the “high tech” and telecommunications
industries).
Cost is another factor. The cost of the
impairment tests is likely to be high and the benefits
may be diminished by their potential unreliability. For
smaller companies, both quoted and unquoted, the
costs may outweigh any possible benefit. To ensure
compliance with SFAS 142 and to avoid unexpected
charges, many companies in the USA are paying more

for professional valuation services to value goodwill
and other intangibles (Boyle & Carpenter, 2011).
Perhaps the most salient issue is that of
subjectivity. The impairment test is subject to a high
degree of subjectivity and uncertainty, which may
make it no less arbitrary than amortisation. The
determination of the fair value of a unit and the
detailed measurement of the implied fair value of
goodwill may be so subjective that the timing and
amount of write-downs may not always be
independently verifiable (Skinner, 2008; Waxman
2001).
Another argument against impairment is that
there are different accounting treatments for other
assets. IFRS 3 does not differentiate goodwill in the
same manner as IAS 38 differentiates other intangible
assets. Goodwill and other intangible assets that are
similar in nature will thus be subject to different
accounting treatments, which will diminish
comparability and reliability.
The new IFRS treatment introduces considerable
scope for uncertainty and therefore creative
accounting (Holt, 2013). The first potential difficulty
relates to identifying cash-generating units. The
identification of a cash-generating unit could be
difficult in cases where a company has acquired
another entity and the latter consists of a number of
separate subsidiaries, divisions and/or branches.
Should the cash-generating unit be identified as the
complete initial entity purchased or should a number
of sub-units be identified? Further, potential
difficulties arise with the overlap between the
identification of cash-generating units and the
assessment of the recoverable amount of the unit.
Determining recoverable amount involves calculating
fair value less costs to sell and value in use of the unit.
However, the identification of the initial cashgenerating unit/units could have a strong bearing on
those calculations. As recoverable amount is
calculated as the higher of a cash-generating unit’s
fair value less cost to sell and value in use, the many
assumptions adopted in the various calculations
required become critical. Just as management could
bias the estimated recoverable amount of a cashgenerating unit in an upward direction to avoid
impairment loss recognition, valuations in the
transition period to the new IFRS treatment could be
biased in a downward direction. In this way, the
company could deliberately recognise possibly
excessive impairment losses in the transition period.
An associated concern relates to cost and time issues.
Conducting a detailed impairment test on every
applicable asset and associated goodwill at the end of
each reporting period will, in many cases, be time
consuming and costly (McGreachin, 1997; Rockness
et al., 2001). For this reason, company management
will have incentives to recognise cash-generating
units at as high a level of aggregation as possible.
In summary, there is scope for creative
accounting. It may well be that goodwill will remain
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on balance sheets and that reported profits will
not be significantly affected by impairment losses
over time. Management will certainly have financial
reporting incentives to avoid recording impairment
losses if possible.
Imlications of impairment
First, the rules provide too much flexibility in the
measurement of goodwill and give firms too much
discretion in timing the write-off. This can lead to
pressure on auditors as The Economist (2013) found.
Second, there is an effect on earnings. Basi and
Penning (2002) note that the one-time charge-offs
that may be made after a change to impairment could
further depress already weak earnings in the financial
records of some companies. They estimate that in the
USA in 2001 nearly two -thirds of major companies
would have to record some impairment of goodwill
on adoption of SFAS 142 (Investor Relations
Business 2001). Third, there is the effect of the
change
from
amortisation
to
impairment.
Amortisation results in a very small effect on the
profitability of the acquiring company, especially
where it is written off over a long period (Basi &
Penning 2002). This was confirmed by the significant
effect of the changeover to an impairment test in 2002
on companies in the USA where goodwill had
been amortised over long periods before (Basi and
Penning, 2002).
Impairment may be avoided because of the
subjectivity it involves for financial report preparers
and auditors, and for its potentially serious impact on
financial results. For example, the introduction of the
requirement for more explicit estimates of fair values
subsequent to initial acquisition may introduce
increased uncertainty and a lessening of transparency,
as the new reporting regime will rely on increased
professional judgment by preparers and auditors
(Skinner, 2008). Specifically, company management,
in collaboration with the accounting profession, will
need to use their valuation and measurement expertise
and skills to estimate fair values rather than refer to
verifiable transaction amounts. By replacing the
amortisation of goodwill with impairment testing
and relying on fair value estimates, further
opportunity for creative earnings management at the
individual company level may have been established
(Gowthorpe and Amat, 2005).
Fair value is defined in International Financial
Reporting Standards as “the amount for which an
asset could be exchanged, or a liability settled,
between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s
length transaction” (see, for example, AASB 3,
Appendix). Unfortunately, determination of the fair
value of an asset in individual situations is not always
straightforward. When capital markets are not perfect
or are incomplete and the fair value concept is
ambiguous with respect to measurement and
valuation, it is possible in individual situations that

several fair values could exist (Barth and Landsman,
1995; Bradbury, 2000). In incomplete market settings,
the alternative fair value constructs of entry value
(replacement cost), exit value (market/liquidation
value)
and
value-in-use
(earnings
capitalisation/present value of future cash flows) are
likely to differ (Beaver, 1981; Barth and Landsman,
1995). Consequently, measurement error in fair value
estimates can exist, affecting their relevance and
reliability. The application of fair value concepts to
the determination of goodwill can result in wide
variations in valuation depending on the assumptions
inherent in the various calculations required.
Auditing
Potential problems for auditors will commence with
the initial entries recording a business combination.
The assignment of fair values to the identifiable net
assets acquired determines the amount of goodwill or
discount on acquisition, given that goodwill/discount
on acquisition is the difference between the fair value
of the identifiable net assets acquired and the cost of
the business combination (Skinner, 2008). A second
potential problem relates to the revised treatment for
discount on acquisition. Discount on acquisition
(negative goodwill) arises when the cost of
acquisition is less than the fair value of the net
identifiable assets acquired, effectively representing a
“bargain purchase” (Boyle & Carpenter, 2011).
Auditors will not only have to deal with the
unexpected complexities and ambiguities but also
regarding the assignment of fair value. Auditors will
also have to verify the identification of cashgenerating units, calculations of the estimated selling
price of the unit, and calculations of the value in use
of the cash-generating unit based on estimates of
discounted cash flows. Hence, all the complexities
involved in confirming the level at which cashgenerating units should be recognised, in estimating a
“hypothetical” market transaction and in estimating
net cash inflows, residual values and discount rates
will result in great scope for disagreement and tension
between auditors and financial report preparers. A
company may engage a professional valuation
services firm to value its cash-generating units and
goodwill, and this practice is occurring with greater
frequency (Wiese, 2005).
In such consulting engagements, the valuation
firm is not restricted by applicable accounting
standards, and is not required to specifically consider
the needs of individual financial report users and
qualitative characteristics such as relevance and
reliability. The company may choose a compliant
valuer to supply a valuation consistent with
management’s wishes. This then potentially places the
auditor in a difficult position when faced with such an
“expert” valuation. Because of the many required
assumptions implicit in valuation that are often not
capable of audit by reference to objective evidence, it
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is the auditor who is put on the “back foot” and in a
defensive position to disprove any valuation procured
by the company’s management (Holt, 2013).
Auditors are not unanimous in their views about
the appropriateness of goodwill accounting rules in
IFRS. This may result from a lack of experience on
the long-term effects of the current practice. Auditors
have a difficult role in balancing between the interests
of those who pay their fees and those who require
accurate information about fair values (Ronen, 2008).
In 2001, the USA introduced a similar
impairment testing system. The American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA, 2003) suggests
that the audit of business combinations and associated
goodwill and other intangible assets is complex,
costly and time-consuming, as many of the audit
objectives require considerable substantive testing to
substantiate the valuation of goodwill. Moreover, if a
company’s reported earnings are to be reduced
significantly, perhaps even resulting in a reported loss
as a result of goodwill write downs, the new
accounting treatment is vulnerable to manipulation
and creative accounting, particularly by management
who might desire a more favourable outcome for
compensation and/or market considerations as
suggested by agency theory (Gowthorpe and Amat,
2005). In summary, the major auditing challenges
arise from the following:
(1) Company directors may bias initial valuations of
assets, liabilities and contingent liabilities in business
combination to: maximise the valuation of goodwill,
which is now not subject to periodic amortisation; and
to maximise the excess of the fair value of net assets
acquired over purchase consideration to enable the
immediate recognition of this excess (discount on
acquisition) as a gain in profit and loss.
(2) There is the potential for disagreement
between company directors and auditors on the
identification of cash-generating units and in the
valuations of those units by reference to recoverable
amount (higher of fair value less cost to sell and value
in use, both of which may require a large number of
arbitrary assumptions to be made in calculation).
(3) The auditor does not have reference, in many
cases, to wholly objective evidence pertaining to the
valuation assumptions adopted by management,
especially in situations where the relevant cashgenerating unit and the assets it comprises are not
subject to active capital markets (and especially where
the unit comprises unique facilities).
(4) A compliant valuer could well provide a valuation
for a cash-generating unit, and related goodwill, that

suggests that no impairment loss needs to be
recognised.
This puts the auditor in an unenviable position of
having to disprove company valuations, especially in
situations where there is a lack of objective evidence
to support any valuation (Rees & Jones, 2012).
Method
The present study covers the only listed companies in
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). It includes both
government and private sector companies. The
enterprises are chosen on the basis of market
capitalization. The top fifty corporate enterprises are
considered for the sample. Two criteria are used for
the selection of the companies in the final sample.
First, the enterprises are listed only in BSE. Second,
their accounting and market data, both were available
for the study
The period covered is three years, ranging from
2010 - 12 as it was considered a reasonably good
period to analyse goodwill treatments due to number
of acquisition by Indian companies. We have picked
data of goodwill, minority interest, profit, auditors,
earning per share and notes on account of goodwill
from annual reports of the companies.
Findings
In the analysis, we have find out that 10 companies of
the top 50 companies (see table 1) are following
goodwill amortization approach as disclosed in their
notes on the accounts in their consolidated financial
statement. However, these 10 companies are not
following any standard approach for number of years
of amortization, this is because the amortization
period allowed may vary between 5 to 15 years. Out
of these 10 companies, two are audited by the Big 4
and the remainder by others.
By contrast, 14 companies show in their notes to
accounts that their goodwill is tested for impairment.
However the financial statements reveal that there is
no impairment done by them during this period.
Surprisingly 8 of the 14 companies are audited by
“Big 4” auditors and although they mention in the
financial statements that they are testing goodwill for
impairment, there is no evidence of actual
impairment. More serious is the finding that 24
companies do not disclose any note on goodwill so no
public information on how goodwill is treated is
available.

Table 1. Analysis of the companies
Treatment of Goodwill
Goodwill amortized
Goodwill Tested for Impairment
No Note on Goodwill
Not amortized but no note on impairment
Total

Big 4
2
8
4
1
15

190

Tier II
1
1
2

Indian
7
6
19
1
33

Total
10
14
24
2
50
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Of the almost 50% (24) of companies that do not
disclose any notes regarding goodwill treatment in
accounts, and most of these (19) are audited by Indian
firms. Rather ambiguously, two companies (audited
by Tier II auditors) have mentioned that they are not

amortizing but have not mentioned whether they are
impairing or not. Overall fifteen companies are
audited by big 4 auditors, two by tier II and the
remaining (33) by Indian auditors.

Table 2. Analysis of the companies
Relationship - EPS+MPS
EPS Increased but MPS decreased
EPS decreased but MPS increased
Both EPS and MPS Increased
Both EPS and MPS decreased
Both EPS and MPS fluctuate
Total

To check whether earnings per share and market
price per share influenced the impairment of goodwill
as market worth of company due to decreases in EPS
and MPS, the relation between earnings per share,
market price of share and price earnings ratio. The
analysis shows that EPS and MPS have gone up for
16 companies but on the other hand 12 companies
have shown both earnings and price going down (see
table 2). For these latter 12 companies some
impairment may be warranted. However, nine
companies (out of 28) have mentioned in their notes
to the accounts that they are testing goodwill for
impairment but still there is no sign of impairment of
goodwill in their accounts.
Conclusion
Goodwill is a complex and controversial intangible
asset. Accounting for goodwill is one of the more
subjective aspects of financial reporting. It is
therefore also very difficult to find an accurate
method for measuring goodwill in terms of whether it
has been consumed or not (Rees & Jones, 2012). In
2001, Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB)
prohibited systematic amortization of goodwill. But, it
seems in India amortisation is still practised by public
companies. The findings of this analysis reveal a
situation where Indian public companies seem to
follow their own or their auditors preferences. Why is
their in India and possibly in many other countries to
what are Western standards requiring impairment?
There are many possibilities to explain such
resistance. First, it seems auditors and particularly
Indian audit firms may be reluctant to change their
practices because of the costs involved and Indian
management may prefer the opportunites for earnings
management that non-disclosure of practice offers.
Second, the lack of effective oversight by the Bombay
exchange allows a variety of practices to continue.
After all, why change if there is no compulsion?
Third, those companies that disclose they are testing
for impairment would seem to meet international
standards but without any actual impairment
following such tests, the true situation remians
ambiguous.

Big 4
1
3
4
3
4
15

Tier II

1
1
2

Indian
3
3
11
9
7
33

Total
4
6
16
12
12
50

The study conducted on the top 50 listed
companies in India provides some evidence that
impairment is being avoided as the data reveals no
actual case of an impairment among the 50 companies
during the period. Yet some of the companies have in
the period expereienced a decline in earnings and
share price. With many of the 50 companies not
disclosing any information around goodwill there is a
lack of transparency inherent that could, at worst
imply some earnings management, at best, a
reluctance to disclose what they are doing or not
doing. The lack of information revealed in this study
indicates that auditors have a difficult role in
balancing the interests of those who pay their fees and
those who require accurate information about fair
values. As the Economist (2013) suggest “arms are
being twisted” by powerful executives. Whether all
Indian public companies will follow international
practices and recognise measure and disclose
impairment unambiguously remains – “to be or not to
be”.
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